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3.1  Introduction 
The main issue of housing in Japan is affordability. Due to social and eco- 
nomic factors, the price of housing in Japan is extraordinarily high. Moreover, 
Japanese financial institutions do not lend on as generous terms as in other 
countries, placing significant liquidity constraints on aspiring homeowners. 
In this paper I examine several problems of financing the purchase of hous- 
ing in  Japan  in  order to  identify directions for future reform in  Japanese 
housing finance in the context of  ongoing financial liberalization initiatives. 
Housing finance in Japan is predominantly generated from the deposit-taking 
system, whether by  commercial banks or public-sector lending institutions. 
Reforms, therefore, should focus on means to broaden the source of funds as 
one strategy to remove credit constraints and to mobilize capital more effi- 
ciently for housing finance. 
Public-sector lending plays an important role in the Japanese housing fi- 
nance system. The government-run Japan Housing Loan Corporation (JHLC) 
is the largest single mortgage lender in the world and accounts for some 25 to 
35 percent of housing loans in Japan. Unlike other advanced industrial nations, 
Japan has no major private-sector institutions that specialize in housing fi- 
nance, like the savings and loan associations in the United States and building 
societies in the United Kingdom. 
Section 3.2 is an overview of the Japanese housing finance market and hous- 
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ing finance systems. Section  3.3 examines JHLC home financing policy  in 
terms of efficiency and equity. Section 3.4 briefly describes other aspects of 
the Japanese housing finance system related to recent steps toward financial 
liberalization. 
3.2  Overview of the Housing Finance Market and Systems in Japan 
3.2.  I  The Housing Finance Market 
The structure of the mortgage market in Japan is shown in figure 3.1. The 
state-run JHLC is the lender of last resort. Recently, there have been consider- 
able efforts to develop specialized  private-sector  mortgage-lending  entities. 
Mortgage companies and banks are becoming increasingly active in the hous- 
ing finance market, although their presence is still small relative to their coun- 
terparts in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
The Japan Housing Loan Corporation 
The JHLC was established in  1950 as a special public corporation that pro- 
vides long-term capital at a low rate of  interest for the construction and pur- 
chase of housing. The JHLC obtains its funds from the postal savings system, 
not directly from public revenues. 
The flow of loans by JHLC is indicated in figure 3.2. The JHLC draws funds 
from the Fiscal Investments and Loans budget. The amount of  money to be 
loaned and the number of houses to be built with these loans each year are 
determined by the budget for the Fiscal Investments and Loans program. This 
program draws funds from the postal savings system through the Trust Fund 
Bureau, from postal life insurance and postal annuities, and from bonds offered 
for public subscription by government agencies. Its budget is submitted to the 
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Source: McGuire 1981, fig. 13-1. 
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Fig. 3.2  The flow of loans by the JHLC 
Source: Ministry of Construction, 1987, fig. 60. 
Diet each year during deliberations  on the overall budget bill. The JHLC makes 
loans at a lower rate of interest (currently about 5.4 percent) than the rate of 
interest on the funds drawn from the Fiscal Investments and Loans program 
(currently about 6.7 percent) and receives a government grant covering the 
interest-rate  differential.  In 1989, about 14.5 percent of the total budget for the 
Fiscal Investments and Loans program was allocated for housing construction 
through the  JHLC.  It  is  important to  emphasize that  capital for housing- 
purchase loans in Japan is primarily mobilized from the deposit-taking system 
(i.e., through short-term savings) by both the JHLC and commercial banks. 
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of JHLC loans in 1989. Loans are made to 
private individuals who intend to acquire their own houses, private individuals 
and local housing-supply corporations  that intend to build rental housing, local 
housing-supply corporations and enterprises such as commercial developers 
that intend to build houses for sale, and enterprises that intend to undertake 
urban renewal projects. On the demand side in 1989, about 78.3 percent of the 
JHLC  loans  were  allocated  to  construction  and  purchase  of  new  owner- 
occupied housing, and only 6.2 percent were allocated to the purchase of  sec- 
ondhand owner-occupied housing. Generally, JHLC lending favors new hous- 
ing, with much stricter limits and lending criteria for used housing, thus acting 
to depress resale value of homes and discouraging the development of a mort- 
gage market in used homes. As for supply-side policy, only 4.7 percent of the 
JHLC loans were allocated to construct rental housing. 
Other Institutions 
The other large lenders are the commercial banks and housing loan compa- 
nies that are subsidiaries of  commercial banks. These banks began providing 52  MikiSeko 
Table 3.1  Japan Housing Loan Corporation Loans, 1989 
Type of Loan 
Amount Lent 
(billions of yen)  Percentage 
Construction of owner-occupied housing 
Purchase of owner-occupied housing 
Purchase of secondhand owner-occupied housing 
Rented housing 
Development of housing sites 
Rehabilitation of  owner-occupied housing 
























Source: Housing Loan Corporation 1990. 
housing loans in  1961. Figure 3.3 shows the proportion of outstanding loans 
of commercial banks to construction and real estate industries and the share of 
funds allocated to housing. Both proportions have shown a marked increase in 
the 1980s as a result of the real estate boom. It is important to bear in mind that 
there are no major private-sector institutions specializing in housing finance in 
Japan, as exist in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
In addition, there are several other public housing finance institutions in 
Japan, but their role in housing finance is small compared to the JHLC. 
Mortgage Market 
The striking characteristic of Japanese housing finance in general is the vir- 
tual absence of a mortgage market for used houses. Unlike in the United States, 
mortgages are not bought and sold as commodities. This absence of  trade 
in mortgages acts as an impediment to the flow of capital into housing finance 
markets. Among the factors that explain why an active mortgage market has 
not yet emerged in Japan, it appears that the government’s longstanding infor- 
mal policy of  maintaining low  interest rates on housing loans has rendered 
mortgages unattractive investment instruments. The absence of private-sector 
institutions specializing in mortgages has also hindered the development of a 
mortgage market. In addition, there is a limited legal foundation for a mortgage 
market, since gaining clear title to real estate pledged as collateral on a loan 
is difficult. 
Private versus Public Loans 
The housing finance systems in Japan comprise an unusual combination of 
private- and public-sector loans. Figure 3.4 indicates the origin of housing 
loans since 1965. Before 1965, almost all of  the housing loans were public, 
because private financial institutions had to allocate their funds to the huge 
demand for business investment (for industrial capital formation). During the 53  Housing Finance in Japan 
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Fig. 3.3  Commercial loans oustanding by industry 
Source: Economic Statistics Monthly (Bank  of Japan), various issues. 
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Fig. 3.4  Source of housing loans 
Source: Housing Loan Corporation 1990. 
1980s, commercial lending markedly increased, while JHLC loans fluctuated 
between 20 and 30 percent of total housing loans. The percentage of housing 
loans outstanding since 1965 is indicated in figure 3.5. The housing finance 
market in Japan has expanded greatly since 1965, marked by a decreasing reli- 
ance on public loans and a rapid increase in private loans. After 1975, the share 
of private loans decreased because their rate of growth declined. In the 1980s, 
however, there was a marked increase in property-related lending by commer- 
cial banks. In 1990, the share of bank loans outstanding for households rose to 
16 percent of the total, for the first time exceeding the share for manufacturing 54  MikiSeko 
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Fig. 3.5  Housing loans outstanding 
Source: Housing Loan Corporation 1990. 
firms, while the share for property companies rose from 4 percent in 1970 to 
12 percent in  1990.’ The surge of household and private-sector money into 
property sparked a self-perpetuating land price spiral, fed by continued hectic 
commercial lending and the certainty that prices would continue soaring. Gen- 
erally, mortgage loans are available only for new construction, but speculators, 
construction companies, developers, and real estate offices all have access to 
other funds for property-related investments. In the mid-l980s, banks actively 
sought to boost property-related lending. They mistakenly credited the myth 
that land prices always go up and thus ran little risk if  loans were secured by 
property. The banks had traditionally lent heavily to manufacturing firms, but 
this source of business dried up in the mid-1980s as manufacturers increas- 
ingly turned to equity markets to raise money. Given the unprecedented expan- 
sion of Japan’s money supply in the 1980s, a result of the yen’s rapid apprecia- 
tion and low interest rates, ample funds were available for speculators and 
others with minimal monitoring. This explains the current severe problems of 
housing loan corporations and banks; with the bursting of the bubble, the rate 
of nonperforming loans has risen dramatically. 
Interest Rates for Housing Loans 
Figure 3.6 shows interest rates for housing loans in Japan. Government pol- 
icy has deliberately kept mortgage rates low, although they have risen since 
1989 in line with government policies aimed at curbing real estate speculation 
in the overheated property market. In the Japanese financial system, key inter- 
est rates are established by  the government through the Bank of Japan. Exact 
levels of  key  interest rates and deposit-rate ceilings are determined by  both 
1. “Survey: The Japanese Economy,” Economisf,  March 6, 1993.6. 55  Housing Finance in Japan 
negotiation and discussion among other monetary authorities. Once the key 
interest rates are determined, all other rates find their levels in the market. The 
rate of interest charged by the JHLC is modest and below market interest rates. 
Until recently, private loans for housing have been provided largely on a 
fixed-interest basis2 The proportion of  private housing loans provided on a 
variable-interest basis has risen sharply since they were introduced in 1983, by 
1989 constituting about two-thirds of  private housing loans (46.5 percent in 
1987,57.2 in 1988, and 66.5 in 1989). The introduction of floating rates is part 
of  the  process  of  financial liberalization,  as  banks  scramble  to  adjust  to 
interest-rate deregulation; as long as the government kept interest rates low, 
banks could extend fixed-interest loans at little risk; now they must move  to 
reduce their vulnerability to interest-rate  increase^.^ 
3.2.2  Homeowner Financing 
Commercial Housing Loans 
The standard conditions for private housing loans are 
1. Borrowers: Twenty to sixty years old (less than seventy when repayment 
is completed). 
2. Using time-series data, Seko (1991) has shown that, under inflation, credit constraints in 
Japan exist where standard fixed-payment mortgage is dominant. 
3. See Arima (1986). Association for Promoting Housing Finance (1986), Boleat (1985), Hori- 
oka (1988), Ichimura (1981), Izu (1988), Mills and Ohta (1976), and Muramoto (1986) for more 
details about Japanese housing markets and housing finance systems. 56  MikiSeko 
2.  Size of loan: Usually between 70 and 80 percent of the price of the house, 
and less than 30 million yen; a maximum of three to four times annual income. 
There is no legal down-payment requirement, but the usual self-financing ratio 
is more than 30 percent. 
3. Interest rate: 6.78 percent fixed-rate, 6.00 percent variable-rate. 
4.  Terms of  repayment: A maximum of twenty-five years for a fixed-rate 
housing loan and a maximum of thirty years for a variable-rate housing loan 
in the case of city banks. 
5. Method  of  repayment:  Usually  the  standard  mortgage  system  (i.e., 
monthly payments are constant in nominal terms). 
6. Collateral: The first rights to the mortgaged property. 
7. Guarantee:  By contracted  guarantee company or  security  for housing 
8. Life insurance: Contracted group life insurance. 
loans. 
JHLC Loans 
The JHLC puts limits on the amount and cost of  its loans. Conditions on 
loans by the JHLC for new individual home purchasers as of 1992 are as fol- 
lows (Ministry of Construction, Housing Bureau 1985, 1989). 
1. Size of loan: The size of a loan is specified according to the floor space 
of a house, the region in which the house is built, the structure of the house, 
and so forth. For instance, an individual can normally borrow a total of  14.0 
million yen, consisting of 7.3 million yen for the house and 6.7 million yen for 
the land, if the borrower acquires a wooden house in a large metropolitan re- 
gion. This amount of money corresponds to 30-40  percent of the cost of the 
house and the lot, and the borrower must add funds on hand, loans from a 
private financial agency, and so forth, to this amount to purchase the house. If 
a borrower wants to borrow money just to build a house, the land area owned 
by the borrower must exceed one hundred square meters. It should be pointed 
out that lending criteria favor borrowers who already own land. The JHLC has 
special provisions for providing additional loans to households with aged or 
handicapped  people,  in  cases where  two households live together, and for 
energy-efficient houses. 
2. Interest rates: The interest rate is classified for ten years after a loan is 
made by the size of a house, except for a person with an income over 10 million 
yen. The initial rate for the first ten years is 4.9 percent for 70-125  square 
meters, 5.25 percent for 125-55  square meters, and 5.6 percent for 155-220 
square meters. From the eleventh year on, the rate of interest is fixed at 5.6 
percent. The rate of interest applied to a person who earns an income of more 
than 10 million yen in the preceding year is fixed at 5.6 percent from the outset. 
3. Terms of repayment: A loan must be repaid within twenty-five years for 
wooden housing of noncombustible construction, within thirty years for hous- 
ing of quasi-fire-resistant construction, and within thirty-five years for housing 
of fire-resistant construction. 57  Housing Finance in Japan 
Table 3.2  Source of Funding for Purchase of Custom-made Housing 
(percentage  of contribution) 
Source of funds  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Proportion of self-financing 
Personal savings 
Selling real estate 











29.2  29.1  29.2  29.9  26.7  26.0 
6.3  7.1  9.8  10.9  11.0  14.7 
0.5  2.0  2.1  2.0  1.9  1.6 
2.5  1.6  4.0  2.7  2.5  1.9 
38.6  39.8  45.1  45.6  42.2  44.2 
1.7  1.6  1.7  1.2  1.0  0.9 
39.6  38.0  34.5  35.3  42.6  39.3 
9.2  7.7  8.8  5.9  4.4  3.6 
10.6  12.3  9.8  11.5  9.5  11.8 
0.2  0.6  0.0  0.5  0.3  0.3 
61.4  60.2  54.9  54.4  57.8  55.8 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Ministry of Construction 1989. 
4. Method of repayment: A loan must be repaid on a principal-and-interest- 
equality basis: the step repayment system, which reduces monthly payments 
for the first five years, is also available. 
5. Housing construction standards: Housing built with loans from the JHLC 
must not only conform to the Building Standard Law and other laws and ordi- 
nances, but also meet the housing construction  standards established by  the 
JHLC. The JHLC enforces these requirements through design inspections and 
field inspections made by  local government bodies, thereby ensuring good- 
quality hou~ing.~ 
Source of  Funds 
Table 3.2 outlines the wide variety of financing strategies that Japanese own- 
ers use when purchasing a d~elling.~  The proportion of self-financing is about 
40 percent, of which about 25-30  percent is from personal savings. This ratio 
may be biased downward: if a new owner borrows money from parents without 
collateral and applies it toward the down payment to the developer, the amount 
of money would still be counted as loans instead of down payment (Hayashi, 
Ito, and Slemrod 1988). About 40 percent of the purchase price is financed by 
public loans. One of the anomalies of the Japanese housing finance system is 
the relatively small role of commercial lending, about 12 percent of the total. 
Another anomaly is the relatively large role of personal savings; home buyers 
raise about one-quarter of the purchase price from their own savings. 
4. See Okazaki and Urabe (1986) for more details. 
5. Figure 3.4 indicates the origin of housing loans for all kinds of housing; table 3.2 indicates 
detached houses only. 58  MikiSeko 
3.3  JHLC Home Financing Policy 
3.3.1  JHLC Housing Construction Policy 
In Japan, the Housing Construction Program Law was enacted in  1966 to 
promote further housing construction through the united efforts of the central 
government, local government bodies, and the public. The law prescribes that 
the minister of construction submit a draft of a five-year plan for housing con- 
struction by  considering the Housing and Housing Land Council’s opinion. 
The final draft is decided upon by  the Cabinet. 
In  each five-year plan, the government must decide the specific goals for 
housing conditions and set the target of the number of units to be built by  both 
the private and public sectors. Local government bodies, the JHLC, and the 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) are given targets for 
the number of  units to be built within the planned period.6 The minister of 
construction divides the nation into ten regions and decides on a five-year pro- 
gram for local housing construction in each region. Each prefecture decides 
on a five-year program for housing construction based on the regional program. 
Five five-year programs have been enacted in conformity with the Housing 
Construction Program Law. 
In the first program (1966-70),  the planned share of JHLC-funded housing 
was 44.4 percent, and its rate of achievement was 100.7 percent. In the second 
program  (1971-75),  the planned  share was  39.7 percent,  and  its  achieve- 
ment ratio was  121.5 percent. In  the third program (1976-80),  the planned 
share was 57.4 percent, and its actual achievement ratio was 134.1 percent. In 
the fourth program (1981-85),  the planned share was 65.5 percent, and its ac- 
tual achievement ratio was 111.7 percent. In the fifth program (1986-90),  the 
planned share was  71.4 percent, and its actual achievement ratio was  110.3 
percent. 
Each successive plan raised the JHLC target level, and in each period the 
JHLC exceeded this target, indicating that its lending program has been suc- 
cessful and popular. Clearly the JHLC has filled a need for subsidized housing 
loans, but past successes notwithstanding, the present JHLC home financing 
policy has problems both in terms of efficiency and equity.’ 
3.3.2  Efficiency 
At present, the JHLC determines the amount of  subsidized loans based on 
floor space. Thus, lending levels are solely based on the quantity of housing. 
6.  The HUDC was founded in 1981 by the government for the purpose of  furthering the supply 
of housing and housing land of good quality to middle-class workers in large metropolitan regions, 
encouraging urban redevelopment, and furthering the development of urban parks in order to en- 
hance the living environment. HUDC public housing is available on a lottery basis, regardless of 
income, at relatively reasonable prices. 
7. See Ministry of  Construction (1990) and Statistics Bureau (1983, 1988) for Japanese hous- 
ing data. 59  Housing Finance in Japan 
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Fig. 3.7  Nonlinear budget constraints 
Source: Seko 1993, fig. 1. 
Notes: F = floor space; C, = composite goods; Po = price of  C,; yo = nominal income; % = 
yJP, = real income; UCC(I),,, = the user cost of capital of  owner-occupied housing for kth 
segment (k = 1.2,  3,4);  I = quality of housing. 
Housing decisions of home purchasers, however, depend not only on quantity 
(in this case, floor space) but also on quality. This suggests that the current 
Japanese home financing system distorts borrowers’ housing decisions. 
Kato (1988) and Akiho (1984) examined the effects of the JHLC home fi- 
nancing policy on housing choice and the efficiency of home purchasers based 
on hedonic regression (Quigley 1982). They found that the JHLC lending crite- 
ria had a negligible impact on housing decisions in terms of floor space. Seko 
(1993) also examined the effect of the JHLC’s home financing policy on hous- 
ing decisions and the efficiency of home purchasers based on cross-sectional 
micro data, using econometric analysis. I found that the budget constraint be- 
comes nonlinear and has jumps (as in figure 3.7), because the interest rate on 
JHLC loans is determined by the floor space (see section 3.2.2).8  In response 
to the established criteria for access to subsidized credit, each household dis- 
torts its housing decision by  overconsuming housing quantity and undercon- 
suming housing quality under the present JHLC home financing system. 
8. See Seko (1990) for nonlinear estimation of this aspect. 60  MikiSeko 
3.3.3  Equity 
Current JHLC lending policies favor borrowers who already have land, thus 
conferring  an  advantage  on those  who have  substantial  assets. In addition, 
when we look at the income distribution of the JHLC borrower, the proportion 
of upper-income borrowers is relatively high (13.4 percent on average from 
1986 to 1989).9 
Moreover, because the JHLC makes loans at a lower interest rate than on 
the funds drawn from the Fiscal Investments and Loans program and receives 
a government grant financed by  tax revenues from all Japanese taxpayers to 
cover the interest-rate differential, critics argue that this constitutes a redistri- 
bution of  income from taxpayers to JHLC borrowers.1° The fact that JHLC 
lending policies  favor those who can most easily borrow from commercial 
banks (i.e., borrowers who own land or have a high income) suggests that the 
subsidies are not addressing the problems of those who most need assistance. 
3.4  Some Recent Proposals for the Japanese Housing Finance System 
Generally  speaking, the housing finance system is characterized  by  bor- 
rowing short and lending long. That is, short-term savings of  individuals are 
channeled into long term housing loans by housing finance institutions. This 
is the usual recipe for banking disaster because of a mismatch between assets 
and liabilities. Usually a housing finance institution overcomes this problem, 
either by raising its funds on a long-term basis, or by ensuring that the rate of 
interest on its long-term loans can be changed in line with the rate of interest 
on the short-term savings that it has attracted. 
In Japan, as noted in section 3.2.1, variable-rate mortgages were introduced 
by commercial banks in 1983 as part of the overall process of Japanese finan- 
cial liberalization, partially reducing the banks' vulnerability. However, a hous- 
ing finance institution bears the risk that borrowers will prematurely redeem 
their loans. That is, loans are constantly being paid off as houses with mort- 
gages are resold. Premature redemptions are also a danger if interest rates go 
down and borrowers seek better terms. Moreover, as variable-interest rates for 
mortgages in Japan are based on the long-term prime rate and not fully ad- 
justed to market interest rates, changes in the rates are not sufficient to over- 
come those risks. 
Under these circumstances, securitization  of  mortgages has been recom- 
mended recently in Japan as a complementary housing finance policy."  That 
is, mortgage loans should be converted into a security that can be actively 
9. Upper-income borrowers denote households of annual income exceeding 10 million yen. 
10. For example, Iwata (1977). 
11. Securitization here is different from that in Noguchi's paper (ch. 1 in this volume). 61  Housing Finance in Japan 
traded in secondary mortgage markets, as in the United States Secondary mort- 
gage markets are important to finance real estate transactions because they 
move real estate funds from investors to house buyers, and from areas of capital 
surplus to areas of  deficit. The JHLC is well positioned to play a key role in 
securitizing mortgages in Japan. 
In section 3.2, I noted that the JHLC obtains almost all of its funds from the 
Trust Fund Bureau, which mainly obtains funds from postal savings deposits. 
It is difficult to expand these funds under current Japanese fiscal conditions, 
especially given the elimination of  tax incentives for postal savings and the 
consequent shift of savings into alternative accounts. (The rate of  growth of 
postal savings deposits outstanding is declining. The ratio of the Fiscal Invest- 
ments and Loans budget to GNP is around 8 percent.) This credit squeeze is 
likely to worsen in the near future due to financial liberalization and the pros- 
pects that heightened competition for deposits will raise interest rates. Given 
these prospects, subsidized housing loans will be difficult to sustain at current 
levels. These changed circumstances suggest a need to modify the role of the 
JHLC consistent with fiscal constraints and the evident need to develop a mort- 
gage market that can more effectively channel funds to borrowers while cov- 
ering associated risks. 
In section 3.3, I noted how the present JHLC home-financing policy intro- 
duces inefficiency and inequity. It is possible to reform the state-run JHLC, 
transforming its role as a direct mortgage lender. It would be possible to ex- 
pand commercial loans and rely on the JHLC to enhance the flow  of  funds 
from capital markets to the housing market via the purchase of mortgages and 
the sale of guaranteed mortgage-backed securities like the Government Na- 
tional Mortgage Association (GNMA), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor- 
poration (FHLMC), and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) 
in the United States. Alternatively, the JHLC could serve as a buyer of  mort- 
gages held by private financial institutions and their mortgage-backed securi- 
ties. This would have the same impact as if the JHLC were financing housing 
loans at private loan rates through private financial institutions. 
It is also possible to securitize mortgages held by the JHLC. However, under 
present circumstances wherein interest rates of JHLC loans are artificially low 
due to subsidies, these securities may not be attractive to investors because of 
the increase in the danger of premature redemptions. 
Although the JHLC can play a positive role in the process of securitization, 
this may entail some negative consequences. There are potential risks and so- 
cial costs of  having a large central institution insuring securitized mortgages 
as practiced in the United States. The JHLC’s lack of experience and expertise 
is a serious drawback and could swell the costs to taxpayers. The imbalance in 
the rewards and costs of risk taking in financial markets also suggests that the 
JHLC should weigh carefully its potential impact on private institutions and in 
terms of  public trust. Alternatively, private institutions could play a leading 
role in mortgage securitization. However, there are concerns that those most in 62  MikiSeko 
need may be bypassed by market forces. In addition, funding constraints may 
limit the viability of such an approach. Initial forays into commercial property 
mortgage securitization in Japan have not been very successful, because the 
returns have been low. Raising returns to spark private-sector interest would 
have  an adverse impact on those  seeking mortgages (or paying rents), ex- 
acerbating credit constraints and inequities.  I2 
3.5  Conclusion 
Financial liberalization in Japan is encouraging the introduction and prolif- 
eration of  more sophisticated financial instruments and a process of  market 
deepening. The recent “problem loan” crisis that has devastated housing loan 
companies and generated concerns about commercial banks is a good reminder 
about the need for building a stable, efficient, and diversified mortgage market 
in line with financial liberalization. The relatively undeveloped nature of  the 
Japanese housing finance system is evident in the absence of both a mortgage 
market for used houses and private-sector institutions specializing in housing 
finance. The current woes in the property sector suggest the need for some 
dramatic changes encompassing institutional arrangements and policy pre- 
scriptions. 
Currently, the commercial housing loan market is stagnant even though in- 
terest rates are very low. The recession and administrative guidelines issued by 
the Ministry of Finance have served to dampen property-related lending. This 
is seen as a necessary corrective to the excesses of the so-called bubble econ- 
omy and a means to bring about an orderly decline in property prices. Declin- 
ing  land  prices  would  certainly  lessen  liquidity  constraints  on  house- 
purchasing behavior. However, uncertainties about the market clearing level of 
property prices have dampened buying and selling activity. In this regard, the 
development of  a securitized mortgage market could have desirable conse- 
quences in terms of providing accurate market information, hedging risks, and 
attracting capital to a moribund market and in that way providing some support 
for sliding real estate prices. However, the need for accurate price assessments 
would require individuals and companies to admit substantial losses on prop- 
erty acquired during the peak of the bubble between  1987 and  1989. This 
would also carry implications for loans secured by inflated property assets. 
The recognized need to revitalize the troubled property sector has created a 
receptiveness to innovation and reform. The JHLC and commercial lenders 
have a vested interest in a revitalized property sector and could collaborate to 
draw up measures facilitating the emergence of a securitized mortgage market. 
This may  entail a modified role for the JHLC in line with changing market 
needs. The government may  also want to consider mortgage tax credits to 
12. Kamoike (1988) and Miyao (1989) also mentioned recent proposals in Japan. See Altman 
and McKinney (1986) and Light and White (1979) for the American housing finance system. 63  Housing Finance in Japan 
lessen liquidity constraints. The introduction of a reverse annuity mortgage to 
convert housing stock into flow is another alternative, as Japanese society en- 
ters a period of rapid aging.13 
The source of funding for housing in Japan remains skewed toward personal 
savings, while commercial lending remains a relatively untapped source at 
about 12 percent of the purchase price. Given the high cost of housing in Japan, 
marked by  a rapid price increase in the 1980s, it is increasingly difficult for 
households to mobilize sufficient savings to make down payments that average 
close to 40 percent. Such levels are unheard of in other industrialized nations, 
where there is a much greater reliance on commercial housing loans. Introduc- 
ing a mortgage tax credit as in the United States would significantly lower the 
real cost of commercial lending. 
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